Conceptual analysis of fundamental metaphysical categories and approaches to their comprehension

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with the addition of the last paragraph in the “Distinction” section

Abstract: This research provides a detailed analysis of various approaches to constructing a negative formal metaphysics and identifies their weaknesses. The principal method of investigation is an a priori metaphysical cognition arising through the negation of all objects in the contemplation of absolute nothingness. This method is combined with a conceptual analysis of analogous approaches. The study further examines in detail the potential logical discontinuities that emerge in the transition from one concept to another. The paper proposes an ontological hierarchy consisting of seven fundamental categories: indeterminacy, nothingness, self-reference, negation, distinction, contingency, information. It shows that these categories underlie being itself and directly transform into one another. It attempts a conceptual synthesis linking temporal becoming from non-being in relation to the notion of imaginary time. A detailed comparison is drawn between self-reference and self-negation. It is demonstrated that differentiation precedes the existence of differentiable objects. The study asserts that contingency constitutes the fundamental source of novelty. Within this framework, information is described as a self-referential probabilistic constraint upon the uncertainty of the past, which becomes lawfully actualized in the present. The study supports the view that the laws of physics constitute statistical invariants of a fundamentally random recursive generation of events and their cumulative structuring. It is demonstrated how consciousness arises from the self-referential nature of information. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the purpose of engaging with these foundational concepts, a reflection that reduces itself to a single metaphilosophical principle of “service to reason”, which harmonizes naturally with the ontology described herein. The principal novelty of this research lies in the concise and rigorous synthesis of a wide

range of fundamental concepts and diverse perspectives into a unified metaphysical framework.

Keywords: metaphysics, ontology, indeterminacy, nothingness, self-reference, negation, distinction, randomness, information

Introduction

Since antiquity, metaphysics has occupied a foundational place within philosophy, insofar as it explains how reality is structured. The origins of this discipline are commonly associated with Aristotle [1], yet there is no doubt that human beings posed fundamental worldview questions long before him. Traditional ontological conceptions are usually of a substantialist character [2, p. 89]. Negative metaphysics (in which reality is grounded in negation, lack, indeterminacy, or nothingness) was developed in apophatic theology [3], in Kabbalah [4, pp. 77–78], in ancient Greek philosophy [5, p. 26], in the works of Hegel and his interpreters [6], in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō and his students [7], as well as in Heidegger [8, pp. 16–27] and Sartre [9]. In the second half of the twentieth century and at the very beginning of the twenty-first, attempts were made to formalize negative metaphysics; particularly prominent here are the works of Spencer-Brown [10] and his followers, who explore the relation between distinction and self-reference [11]. Also noteworthy are the works of Graham Priest and his followers [12]. Equally significant is the work of Alain Badiou, who argues that the empty set lies at the foundation of mathematics and that, once a name is assigned to emptiness, it becomes capable of generating new sets (he and his followers discern in this an affinity with the ZF axiomatic system) [13].

In 2025, interest in formal negative metaphysics increased sharply. Several independent theories of recursive reality arising from an initial ontological source (or from nothingness) appeared simultaneously: Glen Walker’s monograph [14], a work by other authors on the same topic [15], the theory of dimensional recursion [16], a logico-topological approach to becoming from non-being [17], as well as online articles that emphasize the role of recursion from nothingness [18] and the contradictory nature of non-being as the driving force of becoming [19]. A theory of meta-monism also emerged (which derives consequences from a fundamental prohibition on indifference and contradiction) [20], together with conceptual studies on the “self-elimination of nothingness” [21] and on the nature of this notion [22]. The author has likewise proposed a formal model of the grounding of physical laws [23], the structure of which is subjected to critical examination in the present article. All these works exhibit logical gaps in the transitions from the primary to the emergent level, which are crucial for the definiteness of their predictions. In this study, a clear hierarchy of basic metaphysical categories will be delineated, very

subtle issues related to them will be clarified, and it will be shown how these categories (not all of which can even unambiguously be called entities) constitute reality. Particular attention is devoted to verifying the absence of gaps in the transitions between them. Let us therefore begin with what is most fundamental.

Indeterminacy

The comparison between absolute nothingness and absolute indeterminacy is an exceptionally difficult topic; there is no definitive agreement as to which of the two is ontologically more fundamental, but at the time of writing this article the author inclines to the view that it is indeterminacy, and arguments in support of this position will be offered below.

Indeterminacy is maximally neutral and can be conceptually related to nothing in particular and to everything at once. Absolute nothingness, by contrast, is more readily associated with prohibition; however, if there is literally nothing, then there is also no significance to the fact that there is nothing. It is a mistake to ascribe anything determinate to nothingness, whereas this is not an error in the case of indeterminacy (which encompasses both determinacy and indeterminacy, since it is not constrained by its own definition). Being can indeed be indeterminacy, insofar as it is not fully saturated but is supplemented and specified over time. In a previous work, it is mathematically demonstrated that everything is constituted out of it [23].

When considering such profound categories, one ought honestly to acknowledge who we are and what we are in fact doing, namely, investigating associations within our own thinking rather than genuine nothingness or indeterminacy. For example, in order to approach an apprehension of nothingness, it would be necessary not only to reduce the entities in our mind to one another, but also to reduce our thinking and our entire being (that is, literally to annul everything that exists). However, there is a definite direction of noetic apprehension in the attempt to think nothingness, namely, away from all objects. What is even more interesting is that there is a clear regularity of thought that arises when one reflects on absolute nothingness: when there is nothing whatsoever toward which imagination can be directed, the subject itself involuntarily becomes the object, and a genuine subject–subject self-reference tends to arise [23, p. 138]. Because what we call reality can, in a lawlike manner, partially integrate these self-references into itself, we are able (at least partially) to think the concept of nothingness. In general, it may seem strange that one can genuinely reflect on all of this at all; here one may be reminded of Nishida’s extremely negative conception of the subject (as the self-knowledge of nothingness) [24], and of Žižek, who explicitly describes the subject as a hole (a void) in the world, an eternal lack of the selfhood of being, and maintains that the ontology of the Big Bang and that of the subject are identical (since both are

grounded in the negativity of emptiness) [25, p. 13]. This may be a plausible explanation of how it is possible consciously to reflect on the category of "nothingness" and on what is proximate to it.

The attempt to think absolute indeterminacy does not even possess sense, orientation, or any lawlike regularity. Indeterminacy signifies everything and, at the same time, nothing. All patterns of thought are in some way bound up with it (in contrast to the reflection on the concept of nothingness); from an epistemological point of view, it is more fundamental. From an ontological perspective, it is simply incorrect to imagine it, since we are not the ones who create the primordial ground of reality; yet this undertaking is nonetheless meaningful, for in our inquiries we are engaged precisely in the interpretation of being, optimizing ourselves in accordance with the cosmos.

And still: is it nothingness or indeterminacy that wholly constitutes reality? The answer is indeterminacy, for it constitutes nothingness (indeed, it does not do so—and this is already irrelevant in ontological, epistemological, and other respects). It embodies the collapse of nothingness that has annulled it, yet it does not follow from nothingness (and, moreover, proceeds from it). Indeterminacy can be conceived as pure potentiality, which is situated not only within time, space, and causality, but also outside all of them. What is extremely strange, and will be argued for in the sections that follow, is that metaphysics and mathematics apparently follow from the primordial source in an unavoidable manner, even though they were not pre-given. Such a state of affairs may be evidence that, at an extremely deep level, the outcome is ontologically prior to the condition of its attainment.

It is also appropriate to reflect on the emanation of absolute indeterminacy. In the present work, this term designates the conception of becoming out of the superabundant plenitude of the potential of indeterminacy. According to this paradigm, all variations of becoming exist atemporally in an implicit manner (this is in some respects reminiscent of Plato's world of Forms [26, p. 521], though it is not the same), and the causal structure of the universe is one of the branches (of which there is an indefinite number) whereby the possibility of its becoming is "justified" post factum by its outcomes. This is not the same as retrocausality: the latter presupposes a high degree of determinacy in influences from the future, rather than a complete ontological grounding of the existence of all variants. Yet even in such a model, the ontological force of the potentials is conditioned by mathematical coherence, and coherence is self-justifying, from absence of cause to complexity. The difference between the manifold conceptions of mathematical universes and the other-being described here is that the latter, in all of its possible principles, is grounded [27, pp. 14–15] in indeterminacy rather than in logical structures that are represented axiomatically and are limited in this respect [28, p. 4]. The author

regards this conception with suspicion, but does not rule it out, since it cannot be refuted. What remains puzzling, however, is that ontological logic issues from nothing (or from something very close to it) in an unavoidable, non-contingent manner, and that its strictness with respect to diverse objects was already inevitable when these entities themselves did not yet exist. It is as if logical completeness were situated outside time and were to "justify" the rationality of its ontology post factum through the development of the world out of nothingness, thereby forming being. It does not appear that the conception under consideration and the doctrine of temporal becoming from non-being are in crude conflict with one another; evidently, they are two perspectives on one and the same phenomenon. Most likely, the topic addressed in this paragraph is in fact the most difficult one in metaphysics, and it unquestionably calls for further investigation.

Nothingness

Initially, negativity was to be assigned second place in terms of fundamentality among the ontological categories. It is a deeper notion than difference or negation. Negativity is neither one nor many; it lies deeper than this very division [13, pp. 37–38]. It embodies an ontological absurdity, a paradox. Without this contradiction, the emergence and existence of anything would be impossible. The most internally inconsistent concept in thought is precisely the category designated in the title of this chapter, since to speak and think about what is not already involves a contradiction. There is greater latitude in reflecting on indeterminacy, because we frankly accept its contradictory character, inasmuch as it is not constrained by it, whereas "nothingness" clearly drives us into an impasse (or, more precisely, into a cycle) [23, p. 145]. To say that nothingness is identical with everything may be useful, since this thesis reflects the contradictory nature of "nothingness"; however, in that case any point in even thinking in the direction of nothingness—and thus in thematizing negativity, absence, and negation—is lost. Absolute nothingness can be approached in thought on account of its paradoxicality, but it cannot be attained. Nothingness is, after all, a determinate concept within thinking, and in its very rigor it collapses into its own failure. Apparently, this is precisely the principle according to which absurd emptiness, which almost certainly constitutes the primordial basis of the subject, is unstable and tends to deviate altogether toward something (toward that which will subsequently be called the object).

Is it true that the entire universe arose from absolute nothingness? The author is convinced that this is indeed the case. Moreover, it is also true that the universe has always existed and that it created itself [29, pp. 483–484]. Being has existed eternally, because prior to it there was nothing. The universe is self-sufficient,

because from the very beginning there were no prohibitions against this. The world arose out of nothing, because nothingness embodies paradoxicality and instability. All three accounts of the origin of the universe are capable of describing one and the same phenomenon, albeit from different perspectives.

Absolute nothingness is the first cause of the emergence of the universe, yet trivial conceptions of causality used to describe it can be misleading. The primordial state embodies an ontological absurdity—nothingness as something that exists and gives rise to becoming. In the present conception, it is the power of actualization, the mechanism by which the potential passes into the actual. Such a claim may appear very strange, for the closer one comes to nothingness, the simpler entities become and the less manifest their being is; yet paradox is precisely the principal driving force of reality. Post factum causality, at the most fundamental level, ontologically justifies itself as an outcome through the non-existence of nothingness and inverts the question concerning it from “Why is there something rather than nothing?” to “Why does nothing not exist?”

Is it correct to regard nothingness as an absolute universal? On the one hand, it may seem that this is so, insofar as it eliminates itself, thereby making being possible. Moreover, even in the positive aspect of reality there is a profound negativity concealed, which allows the universe not to become fixed in any particular state, but to change. Nothingness is present in everything, because actualized being is not just anything whatsoever. On the other hand, in that case any stable state would be instantaneously nullified (including even a fixed logic that would, among other things, describe such a state of affairs). If one attempts to express such a state in terms of time (which is, however, not entirely correct), time would flow at infinite speed and would collapse instantaneously. It appears highly likely that there are no principles at all at the foundation of reality; this is designated here as neutral indeterminacy. It is indistinguishable and is not, contradictory and is not. Absolute nothingness, by contrast, is an ultimately negative notion. Indeterminacy must occupy an ontological position immediately adjacent to nothingness, with nothing lying between these categories. For this reason, the formal derivation of the structure of reality from these concepts is highly appropriate as one of the principal strategies of metaphysics; such an approach has already demonstrated its effectiveness and is likely to yield even greater success.

Self-reference

It is possible to reflect on what is meant by sterile non-being (oukon) [30, p. 35], which does not exist and from which nothing arises (in the previous section a different, meonic definition of nothingness was discussed). What is meant here is that this notion can be unambiguously apprehended as a direction, an orientation for

thought. The concept of sterile non-being (oukon) contains self-reference: it is not, because it is not. Here there is self-reference without anything whatsoever, without any relations or differences. By contrast, relations and differences themselves include self-reference, since no difference is thinkable without a reference or indication.

In epistemology, the concept of self-reference has attracted great interest because of the paradoxes that may be contained in it; the classical example is the liar paradox [31]. Nevertheless, self-reference does not necessarily entail explicit antinomies. A completely different situation arises, however, when self-reference refers exclusively to itself and contains absolutely nothing within itself. In that case, self-reference is itself and yet is not self-identical. It is hardly possible to imagine existence in a simpler state than that of a law which grounds its own being solely in itself, without anything intermediate to mediate the self-reference [32, p. 129].

Self-reference is the ontologically deepest positive category: it is the basis of being, pure actuality. Yet one should be cautious about elevating it to the status of a meta-principle, for what has this status is strictly self-reference exclusively to itself, and this is not fully equivalent to recursive generation with respect to what has already been generated by it. If one simply identifies the two, a crucial logical transition is lost: it remains unclear whether recursion is to be applied to the relata, to the structures, to everything together, or whether some entirely different option is envisaged.

There is even a view that the fundamental mechanism of self-reference forges linear connections between the present state and some iteration of the universe that arose in the past, recursively generating separate parts out of the whole . Such an approach contains a logical gap, because its formal basis is multi-ary causality: immediately after the emergence of the universe, a one-off selection of the complex structures that had arisen became a necessary condition for becoming. That is, the selection of a complex system described here gives rise, in a single act, to one indivisible event that identifies it (although combinations of these selections can create a new context and supplant one another). This proceeds from the complex to the simple, but this concerns the already existing complexity in the events that arise as a result of becoming; it is not an emanation of indeterminacy. In conceptions that place the emphasis on downward causation, the internal contradiction of the notion of "becoming" ceases to unfold in derivative phenomena. Their fundamental formal description is thereby shifted toward a positive ontology, which also leaves its mark on the mathematical conclusions.

The author holds that a theory is more minimalist when, within it, novelty arises from within—from indeterminacy in what is mutually related. Instead of linear non-local references, such an approach can explain the coherence of relations

as an emergent entity that follows from indeterminacy and from the probabilistic unification of its manifestations. This mechanism will be examined in greater detail in the sections that follow.

Negation

The first three categories described are immaterial. The transition from formlessness to determinate being is gradual; it is characterized by entities that occupy the fourth through seventh positions in the present treatise. The first of these is negation; however, despite its name, this is not an absolutely negative category, but a combination of negative nothingness and positive self-reference—the embodiment of being's conflict with itself, though it is not the fundamental source of the contradiction under discussion [8, p. 19]. It is incorrect here to speak of an opposition between nothingness and being, since nothingness itself is the conflict. Negation is a fundamentally unary entity .

Since indeterminacy makes counting possible, nothingness actualizes it, and self-reference designates the very notion of counting, it is appropriate to take negation as the unit. It is a fusion of tendency and act in one, rather than a merely fixed state. The unit is impossible without counting, not vice versa. It is likely to be objected that there is no negation without an object of negation. The reply is that, at the fundamental level, negation is self-directed and does not require a substance. Why, then, is self-reference not joined with negation into a single mode? Self-reference, in a broader respect, characterizes indeterminacy, whereas negation is already a more determinate category. It is not what precedes self-reference, but its manifestation.

Some researchers consider negation not only temporally, but also in normative-logical terms. A significant parallel has been noted between the operation of distinction and that of self-reference , although not their equivalence. There are approaches that thereby reduce time and space to a single entity through an original, fundamentally atemporal cycle "chaos – self-negation – difference – chaos" . From this there follows not only the vagueness of the past, but also the fact that the very flow of time from past to future is, in principle, not definitively determined: it is not the genuine advent of novelty, but an adjustment to the actual resolution of the immanent contradictoriness of reality. Developing this line of reasoning, at the deepest level reality has no distinction between past and future and exists outside time as an infinite becoming toward being and non-being (the latter is not a mistake, but an ontological imperative).

This is reminiscent of imaginary time [37, p. 197]. It is not easy to conceive, but one can offer an example that, while not entirely correct (since the units involved are not absolute), is nonetheless illustrative. Suppose that at present scientists

observe a universe that is about 14 billion years old; it is possible that after 10^{1000} years beings existing then will observe the universe as if it were 10 billion years old, and in its manifestations it will correspond exactly to this. In the present model, "nothing" at the beginning of time resembles an effigy. It mimics various forms: nothing before the universe, the non-being of the future, nothingness as actualizer, non-being as complete stability, the void beyond the bounds of the universe, nothingness within the smallest, subjective non-being before life and after death. It would be strange if all these concepts were genuine nothingness; it is reasonable to select from among them the most "nothing-like" one—namely, that prior to the beginning of time. If one does not do this, why should one not think of "nothing" as anything whatsoever and descend into sophistry by claiming that "life does not differ from nothingness" at all? If one considers the option that it might further ramify into alternative parallel realities, the situation becomes even more complex and almost certainly more erroneous.

Even so, the author inclines to the view that the universe does have a primordial source (even if this source is indeterminacy). The argument here is the logical chain defended in the article: nothingness (as actualizer) – existence as a whole (self-actualization) – becoming (emergence) – determinate being. The emergence of concrete existence without anything else is possible, whereas determinate being without becoming is, in principle, unthinkable. Negation is therefore rather the actualization of a prohibition on the absoluteness of indiscernibility, and thus it cannot contain within itself fully determinate evidence of its own beginning and end. At the fundamental level, negation occurs without cause, whereas causes are already an emergent stabilization of the univocity of future, present, and past.

Distinction

Difference is a binary entity. It likewise contains within itself a positive and a negative side. Its poles are one (since they are characterized by opposition) and yet, at the same time, distinct. Difference is therefore an internal determination of being, rather than an opposition between being and nothingness. Nothingness itself embodies the conflict from which opposition in inequality follows . Between what, then, does the fundamental distinction obtain? Between negation and its self-reference (which is associated with counting as such). The argument here is that this is the difference between the unit and taking the unit to be zero (as if it were not there). It consists in whether being is more nearly itself or closer to a state of non-being (which, however, does not mean genuine nothingness). For this reason, the differences that arise can recede from and approach nothingness, but they will never be transformed into it definitively.

Fundamental difference precedes the definitions of the opposed objects; it merely registers incompatibility [20, p. 5]. It is reminiscent of continuity, in which unity is constituted by contradiction (as opposed to singularity, where everything is homogeneous). The difference here at issue is contradictory in its very ground, and therefore the derivative structures cannot be fully determinate. This attests to the relationality and instability of the very fact of reality, to the fuzziness of existence.

Such claims raise the question of what sense difference can have without the determinacy of the elements being differentiated. The answer is that the concreteness of the opposed poles is here fundamentally not fixed. The foundational difference is the self-limitation of nothingness . The distinguishable objects begin to appear only as emergent entities arising from the regularities of the recursive generation of self-limitations. The more diversely these patterns are interrelated, the more strongly qualities are manifested and the more concrete existence becomes. The totality of their modes of manifestation is reminiscent of the space of eigenforms studied in synergetics; this mode will be elaborated in greater detail in the following two sections.

There are several ways to conceptually represent the connection between poles in a fundamental distinction, depending on how the indication of cause and effect is fixed: as an "arrow," as a "line," and so forth. However, the most accurate representation is likely that of a symmetrical binary relation, where one pole refers to the other, constituting its self-reference. Therefore, in the fundamental causal hierarchy of events, it is not clearly determined what constitutes cause and what constitutes effect. This can be inferred indirectly through the heterogeneity of connections among derivative phenomena: the greater the number of connections converging on certain poles within the structure of distinctions, the more likely it is that these poles are primary. The poles represent mutual self-reference; however, it appears that self-referential causality (where phenomenon A is the cause of B, and phenomenon B is the cause of A) indicates the absence of objective information about the primordial origin within the structure of reality itself. The emerging picture suggests an atemporal logical primordial origin that will eternally attempt to ground itself through temporal recursive generation from absolute nothingness, thereby producing indeterminacies and binary self-referential relations between them (upon the emergence of one indeterminacy from another), which individually contain no information about what originated from what. These indeterminacies constitute the poles of relations (relata) and possess the potential for recursive stochastic generation. The system of such binary relations constitutes the entire structure of the Universe.

Randomness

The first five points were associated with necessity. Contingency occupies the sixth position. It is a characteristic of a binary system, in which the possibility of alternatives already arises. Fluctuations are an immanent attribute of all structures. Without contingent changes, they would be nothing but manifestations of symmetry and would merge with the initial conditions. Such objects are impossible for causal and phenomenal registration; in effect, they do not exist. Some might add that the mechanism of symmetry breaking can also be a teleological principle. However, first, contingency is more minimalist. Second, the ontological status of purpose or will at so deep a level has not been clarified. Variations are possible only out of what has already arisen; from the potential they are difficult to make sense of without invoking retrocausality as an alternative mechanism for the transition from the potential to the actual. One striking example of this approach is the principle of telic recursion in Christopher Langan's theory [39]; there it is declared fundamental, but this greatly complicates the formalism and points to the illusory character of the flow of time.

Randomness is the simplest principle of symmetry breaking, which follows directly from the contradictory nature of primordial difference. Moreover, there is evidence that structures formed by pure randomness possess a cumulative and synergetic effect [23]. They do not collapse, but evolve. Causes there appear rather as constraints on the probability of something than as conditions of existence, which resonates with contemporary views of causality [40]. The deep driving force of changes and their accumulation is indeterminacy, which randomly self-negates and thereby actualizes derivative indeterminacies and the probabilities of their occurrence. However, there are certain doubts about the full mathematical correctness of treating the divergences and convergences of causal hierarchies exclusively in terms of the redistribution of the frequencies of negations (and their subsequent negations), while shifting the semantic weight of the vagueness of the past predominantly into the phenomenal aspect of being. Nevertheless, this is a good basic model of causality, which requires the elimination of logical gaps for further refinement. The idea that physical laws are fundamentally grounded in statistics is not new [41, p. 124], and it is only being reinforced by the spread of reductionist approaches [42].

One may hold the view that randomness is an illusion and does not in fact exist. This position can find partial mathematical support through the application of deterministic rules for the emergence of complexity from simplicity [43]. However, few would dispute that the universe is not fully homogeneous. Even if one assumes that randomness does not exist, there nevertheless remains an asymmetry in the initial conditions (which are described in the present article). Oscillations within a single, or a small group of, primordial contradictions are clearly insufficient to

account for the diversity of the universe; the discordances themselves must be manifold. To the author of the present work, it is unclear how one might conceive a plurality of asymmetries without randomness, or without a teleological or theological principle. The most economical, internally consistent, and concrete explanation of this is the existence of randomness.

Information

The seventh position is occupied by information, causal salience, and the fuzzy space of recursively corroborated probable histories (probabilisticity), all in one. It was initially planned to designate this point as a “Chronicle,” but it was decided to adopt a more traditional term, since it is equivalent to the deep essence of information, which is here understood as the history of a not fully determinate past. The past is not presented as a fixed and immutable fact, but as a stochastic hierarchical structure of causal references (hints at determinacy).

According to this conception, there is, in principle, no precise history of how everything unfolded in all details. There is only a probabilistic echo that is partially actualized in the form of the regularities according to which something occurs in the present. But if the foundational difference, in its ontology, resembles amorphous noise, and randomness constitutes its basic manifestation, then information is the decoherence of the probabilisticity of what most likely arose through what (prior to the fully articulated fixity of values). There are works that take such a constitution of reality to be fundamental and derive from it the metric of space . There also exists a very deep area of theoretical computer science that describes algorithmic constructions based on variables without preset values, namely, the lambda calculus.

Information logically conditions the distinction between time and space. According to the conception advanced in this article, space itself is a single, yet internally contradictory, relational structure. All of its fragments are mutually representable, but not fully determinate, histories. The parts have no fixed identity, and through their dissipation they transmit their selfhood into lawfully actualized objects, which are, in turn, stable insofar as they are formed by a stable correlation of the accumulations of the consequences of random events. In them, binary divergences are integrated, forming a coherent, unified hierarchy.

Representations according to which the unit and a fuzzy duality serve to concretize reality have existed since very early on [46, p. 28], and in recent times this idea has been formalized in the form of significance criteria A and B , or as a bidirectional mechanism of the self-determination of deviations [47, pp. 269–286]. Conceptually, both the approach that establishes being through the double self-negation of nothingness and the binary disturbance of the balance of the void are examined in contemporary studies on the ontology of the cosmological vacuum.

It has already been mentioned in this work that physical laws may be universal statistical invariants of the cumulation of events, grounded in randomness and its mutual constraint (information). This is the most minimalist form of their existence; it requires neither a lawgiver, nor initial conditions, nor a final goal. The fundamental stochasticity of processes satisfies both the epistemic rule of Ockham's razor and the principle of least action in the becoming of the universe out of nothing [50, p. 149].

The symmetry of all processes is randomly broken and then stabilized, returning into a statistical "trap," where a deviation toward a probable scenario further increases that scenario's likelihood [23, pp. 140–141]. Into this trap the self-identity of the facts of the occurrence of events collapses in a lawlike way. When they merge, the causal salience of the emergence and existence of these causal chains probabilistically refers to other parts (causes), which in turn refer to others, and so on. The non-alternativity of modes of recursion is not expressed there, and a superposition arises. Such referentiality resembles primordial difference; it is the basic form of the transmission of identity as such. In turn, the most probable state is itself not sharply fixed, but also fluctuates and stochastically self-specifies, catalyzing itself and localizing causal self-reference. In this way, reality presents itself to itself. This may be an explanation of the nature of consciousness, as well as of how information can function as a "bridge" linking the phenomenal and the physical.

Conclusion

In the main part of this work, extremely deep ontological categories have been successively examined, and it has been shown how the emergent proceeds from the primordial. It has been indicated how, through their combination, time, space, consciousness, the laws of nature as stochastic-cumulative invariants, complexity and development, as well as the language for describing the universe, come to be.

The metaphysical approach that describes reality and the modes of its apprehension from the most fundamental to the derivative has proven its worth, because it succinctly clarifies how basic entities follow from one another. This line of inquiry has already been clearly delineated and continues to demonstrate its effectiveness, passing from the domain of abstract philosophy into that of formal science. The metaphysics of the future must be a priori, logically consistent (without gaps), self-sufficient, maximally systematic, and necessarily falsifiable.

At the present stage, it is important to eliminate logical and mathematical gaps in the transitions from one level to another; even the most contemporary theories (which attempt to encompass many aspects of being at once) suffer from such gaps across the board. Even with these gaps, the resemblance of a theory to

observable phenomena may be very great; yet the key issues lie in the details, and insufficient attention to them in the transition to more complex levels is the principal problem of metaphysics at present. To consider one and the same thing from different perspectives, even within metaphysical works, is highly effective.

The author holds that, owing to its arbitrariness, indeterminacy is ontologically more minimalist than nothingness. Nothingness, in turn, can be compared metaphorically, yet quite aptly, to the unique name of reality [13, p. 38] and to its mirror . The failure to comprehend absolute nothingness reflects thought away from itself toward the apprehension of existence and thereby turns into a success in the description of reality. To the author, this is reminiscent at once of the concept of the Dao and of the idea of serving God. Such an association is appropriate if God is understood not as a conscious, omnipotent subject endowed with free will (which is unlikely to exist), but as a logic of deflection that underlies being. Reason, accordingly, is not something to be merely aspired to, but something to which one ought to render service.

The psyche is recursive and acknowledges first and foremost simple, lawfully corroborated things; it is precisely the concreteness of the first word in the phrase “service to reason” that is of exceptional importance here and is capable of transforming the very structure of thinking. Reason does not contradict sensations, but is their best ally in the long term. A person who sincerely adopts this as a fundamental life principle will, as a matter of course, be maximally actualized and energetically optimized, since in practice such a person will be transmitting rationality—not merely in deeds and aspirations, but as a whole. Such a person is open to reason and, by means of this openness, will bring to light very subtle yet significant details through their activity. In these details lies the success of any undertaking. They can render existence either beautiful or wretched. Human beings have reflected on primordial sources since deep antiquity, yet much time has passed, and it is evident that something has impeded the disclosure of these foundations. What has hindered and continues to slow this development is the trap of linear logic. The obstacle has been the neglect of the fact that metaphysics is living in its very nature, despite being the deepest theoretical domain. Metaphysics is present in those who engage in it; it is a synthesis of their thought and their nature. For an absolute theory, an absolute principle of approach is required, and nothing less.

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